Unilateral adoption of transfer pricing regulations may have a negative impact on real investment by multinational corporations (MNCs). This paper uses a quasiexperimental research design, exploiting unique panel data on domestic and multinational companies in 27 countries during 2006-2014, to find that MNC affiliates reduce their investment by over 11 percent following the introduction of transfer pricing regulations. There is no significant reduction in total investment by the MNC group, suggesting that these investments are most likely shifted to affiliates in other countries. The impact of transfer pricing regulations corresponds to an increase in the "TPRadjusted" corporate tax rate by almost one quarter, or equivalently, a 15-percent increase in the elasticity of investment with respect to the cost of capital.
Introduction
Tax-motivated profit shifting within multinational corporations (MNCs) has been on top of the international tax policy agenda since the global financial crisis -most notably due to the G20/OECD initiative on base erosion and profit shifting (OECD 2015) . Profit shifting means that MNCs shift income from affiliates in high-tax jurisdictions to those in lowtax jurisdictions to reduce their overall tax liability. There is ample empirical evidence demonstrating that extensive profit shifting is taking place. For example, it is found that German affiliates of MNCs have paid on average 27 percent less in taxes than comparable domestic German firms (Finke, 2013) . In the UK, taxable profits as a share of total assets reported by subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are on average 12.8 percentage points lower than those of comparable domestic standalone companies (Habu, 2017) .
1
A common way for MNCs to shift profits is through the manipulation of transfer prices, that is, the prices charged for transactions between related parties. These transfer prices are necessary to determine the allocation of profits between affiliates of a MNC group. Tax laws generally prescribe that these prices should be arm's length, reflecting market prices that unrelated parties would have used for similar transactions. However, due to information asymmetries vis-à-vis the tax administration, MNCs can often charge artificially low or high prices for sales between related parties in high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions, thereby shifting profits and reducing their overall tax liabilities.
Many governments limit the extent of transfer mispricing by implementing transfer pricing regulations (TPRs). These generally describe the methods allowed to determine arm'slength prices, prescribe documentation requirements, set penalties in case of non-compliance, and determine the probability of a transfer price adjustment. TPRs can raise the effective tax burden on MNCs, thus protecting domestic revenue and leveling the playing field vis-à-vis domestic companies (OECD, 2013; Fuest et al., 2013) . Dharmapala (2014) and Hines (2014) comprehensively discuss the extent of profit shifting by multinationals. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) provide a quantitative review of 25 empirical studies on profit-shifting behavior of multinationals. A more recent survey article by Beer et al. (2018) finds a consensus semi-elasticity of reported profitability by MNCs with respect to the international tax differentials of around -1.2. Regarding the scale of revenue loss from international tax avoidance, recent estimates suggest an annual loss in government revenue by between $100 and 650 billion globally, with disproportionately larger losses found for developing countries (UNCTAD, 2015; OECD, 2015; Crivelli et al., 2016) .
2 From the perspective of the MNC, TPR may also increase tax uncertainty (Mescall and Klassen, 2018;  TPR may have unintended consequences on MNC investment. If MNC investment would decline in response to the introduction or strengthening of TPR, this could offset its benefits, especially if multinational investments yield positive productivity spillovers to local firms (Andrews et al., 2015) . The exact relationship between TPR and investment, however, has received little attention in the literature, both in theoretical and empirical research.
3 Indeed, there is currently no direct empirical evidence regarding the investment effect of TPR.
4
To fill this gap in the literature, this paper explores the effect of TPR on multinational investment. First, we develop a simple model to infer the likely impact of TPR on the scale of multinational investment. The key channel in the model is that TPR makes it costlier for the MNC to manipulate transfer prices and, thereby, to shift profits into the low-tax country (or alternatively, shift profits out of the high-tax country). This reduces the optimal supply of intermediate inputs and, thereby also reduces the return on its investment in the foreign affiliate. Indeed, TPR increases the cost of capital so that fewer investments in the foreign affiliate are undertaken.
Guided by this theory, the paper then empirically explores the impact of TPR on MNC investment. We employ a micro-level dataset containing rich information on both MNC and purely domestic affiliates. The main dataset comprises 27 countries during 2006-2014. This is combined with information on the introduction date of TPRs and an indicator of their strictness. Our analysis starts with a standard difference-in-difference (DD) approach, where the identifying variation comes from the differential change in investment by a MNC affiliate relative to investment by a purely domestic affiliate in response to the introduction of TPR in the local economy. We also run panel regressions, similar to the estimation approach used in Overesch (2009) , Riedel et al. (2015) and Buettner and Wamser (2013) , to estimate changes in the tax sensitivity of multinational investment due to TPRs. The latter follows a more structural approach, allowing us to back out the "TPR-adjusted" cost of capital elasticity, IMF and OECD, 2017) . This is discussed in Section 2. 3 An exception is Peralta et al. (2006) , which shows in a fiscal competition model that countries may optimally choose not to control international profit shifting in order to attract more MNC activities.
4 Recent studies have assessed the impact of TPR on reported profitability by MNC affiliates and provide mixed evidence: some find that they lead to an increase in the MNCs' reported operating profits, while others find no significant effect (Riedel et al., 2015; Saunders-Scott, 2013) . Some studies have also looked at the effect of thin capitalization rules -another form of anti-avoidance policy -on investment (Buettner and Wamser, 2013) .
and is less susceptible to the influence of general equilibrium effects compared to the DD analysis.
The results from the DD regressions point to a strong negative impact of TPR on MNC investment: investment in foreign affiliates is, on average, around 11 percent lower following the introduction of TPR, compared to investment in similar firms that are wholly domestic.
The panel regression suggest, moreover, that the "TPR-adjusted" corporate tax rate is 23 percent larger, i.e. MNC investment responses to tax rates are almost one quarter larger if TPRs are in place. The overall estimated elasticity of investment with respect to the cost of capital is around -0.69, of which 15 percent is due to increased sensitivity following the introduction of TPRs.
Deeper analysis suggests that the investment response to TPR varies in several dimensions. For instance, the effect size rises in the strictness of the TPR but decreases in the share of intangible assets of firms; and the effect is more robust at the intensive than at the extensive margin of investment. Effects are also found to be larger if the tax differential grows, but this relationship is not monotonous and responses actually become smaller at very large tax differences. We also uncover asymmetric effects of the TPR that vary across key characteristics of the larger tax system in a country. The investment effect of TPR is larger and more robust in countries that also employ thin-capitalization rules (TCRs). Moreover, while the TPR unambiguously reduces investment and reported profits in low-tax countries, its effect on reported profits is smaller in high-tax countries. Using a different dataset of consolidated accounts, we find further that lower investment in MNC affiliates does not lead to a similar reduction in total investment by the MNC group. We interpret this as evidence of relocation: the multinationals divert their investment away from countries that introduce TPR toward other countries with no TPRs. This paper contributes to a growing literature that exploits cross-sectional variation to study the effects of anti-avoidance legislations on key aspects of firm behavior, including reported profits (Saunders-Scott, 2013 Beer and Loeprick, 2015; Marques and Pinho, 2016; Nicolay et al., 2016) , transfer prices (Clausing, 2003; Bernard et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2018; Vicard, 2015; Cristea and Nguyen, 2016; Flaaen, 2016; Liu et al., 2017) , and capital structure (Buettner et al., 2012; Buettner and Wamser, 2013; Blouin et al., 2014; Merlo and Wamser, 2015; De Mooij and Hebous, 2017) . Our analysis complements these studies by looking at the impact of anti-avoidance legislation on MNC investment, which to date has been explored only in the context of thin capitalization rules (Buettner et al., 2014) . Our paper also directly relates to studies of profit-shifting opportunities on MNC investment (Hines and Rice, 1994; Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Desai et al., 2006; Overesch, 2009) , and the larger literature on taxation and business investment (Cummins et al., 1994; Caballero et al., 1995; House and Shapiro, 2008; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006; Yagan, 2015; Zwick and Mahon, 2017) , by offering a new perspective on the investment effect of TPRs.
The results in the paper are important for the current policy debate on international taxation. For instance, the negative investment effects from TPRs can make governments reluctant to introduce them unilaterally or encourage them to adopt more lenient regulations in order to mitigate adverse effects on investment. Binding global coordination can prevent this. Restricting the opportunities for countries to set their own anti-avoidance regulations can, however, reinforce tax competition among countries in the use of corporate tax rates (Keen, 2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Bucovetsky and Haufler, 2007) . The results imply further that coordination should also cover other anti-avoidance rules (such as thin-capitalization rules) as otherwise TPRs might cause substitution into other avoidance channels.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of TPR across countries. Section 3 develops a simple model to illustrate how TPR can affect MNC investment into an affiliate. Section 4 describes the data and sample selection used for the empirical analysis. Section 5 explains the research designs and Section 6 reports the main results. Section 7 elaborates on the results for total investment by the MNC group, based on consolidated accounts. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
Transfer Pricing Regulation
The current system of international taxation is largely based on separate accounting. This means that the unconsolidated account of a multinational affiliate terminates at the border. To determine the income in each affiliate, the multinational must use transfer prices for transactions, including both exports and imports, between related parties. In principle, the setting of transfer prices should follow the arm's-length principle, meaning that prices of goods and services sold between related parties mimic prices that would be used in transactions between unrelated parties.
5 Given the nature of related-party transactions, there can exist a wide range of arm's-length prices for the same transaction, especially when a comparable transaction does not exist for unrelated parties. Also, it can be costly for tax authorities to verify whether a transfer price used by a MNC is indeed arm's-length. Consequently, MNCs have some discretion to under-price exports sold from an affiliate in a high tax country to an affiliate in a low tax country (or over-price imports), thereby shifting profits and reducing their global tax burden.
There is ample empirical evidence for the presence of tax-motivated transfer mispricing.
Most of these studies estimate how the price wedge between the arm's-length price observed for unrelated transactions and the transfer price used for related party transactions varies with the statutory CIT rates in the destination country relative to the origin country. Studies for the US, UK and France find evidence for significant responses of the price wedge to the tax rate differential, as supportive evidence for tax-motivated transfer mispricing by MNCs (Clausing, 2003; Bernard et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2018; Vicard, 2015; Cristea and Nguyen, 2016; Flaaen, 2016; Liu et al., 2017) .
To limit transfer mispricing, several countries have introduced transfer pricing regulations (TPRs). These offer guidance in the implementation of the arm's length principle and often include various specific requirements. For instance, they limit the methods that can be used by a MNC for establishing an arm's length price; specify requirements for the documentation needed to support the transfer price used by a MNC; and set transfer-pricing specific penalties if mispricing is detected or adequate documentation not provided. The scope and design of these regulations vary between countries and across time. Stricter regulations could increase the cost of transfer mispricing and, indeed, are found to be effective in curbing the extent of profit shifting in advanced economies. For example, Riedel et al. (2015) show that the introduction and tightening of TPRs raises (lowers) reported operating profits of high-tax (low-tax) affiliates and reduces the sensitivity of affiliates' pre-tax profits to corporate tax rates.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the impact of TPRs on investment. It uses two policy variables to capture TPRs. First, we use a discrete variable T P R kt to reflect the introduction of transfer pricing regulation. This dummy variable takes the value of 1 in the years after country k introduced some TPR in year t to capture the effect of TPR implementation, and is zero otherwise. This information is derived from Deloitte's annual Transfer Pricing Strategic Matrix and is summarized in Mescall and Klassen (2018) . Panel A in Figure 1 provides Saunders-Scott (2013) ). 6 Mescall and Klassen (2014) use these features to explain the 6 These detailed TPR features include 12 regulatory variables on whether: (1) the government allows advance pricing agreements, (2) benchmark data are available to taxpayers, (3) the government requires contemporaneous documentation, (4) cost-contribution arrangement is allowed, (5) commissionaire arrangement is allowed, (6) foreign comparables are allowed to estimate transfer prices, (7) related party setoffs (bundling of transactions) are allowed, (8) the taxpayer is required to pay the tax assessment before going to competent authority, (9) the government identifies an order of transfer pricing methods to use, (10) the government requires disclosure on the tax return concerning related party transactions, (11) the government allows a self-initiated adjustment, (12) Figure 1 shows the variation in tprisk both across countries and over time in our dataset, reflected by the median, the 25th and 75th percentiles, and the minimum and maximum value. We see that the dispersion across countries has become smaller in recent years, while the median has remained at a similar level.
Theory
This section develops a simple model to illustrate the impact of TPR on multinational investment in a foreign subsidiary. Assume that a multinational parent resides in home country h. It decides on how much capital (k) to invest in its foreign subsidiary in country s. For simplicity, it is assumed that the investment is financed by equity at a cost r, which forcement variables on: (13) whether the government has discretion over penalty reduction, (14) whether the government uses proprietary tax data to calculate a "revised" transfer price, and (15) the assessed degree of transfer pricing enforcement as a percentage based on transfer pricing experts' 1 to 5 assessment of enforcement strictness, where a score of 1.0 (5 out of 5) is most strict and 0.2 (1 out of 5) is least strict. 7 Specifically, the perceived transfer pricing risk depends on these TPR features in the following way: tprisk = 1.27 * * * + 0.262 * * SecretComparables − 0.437 * * * AP A + 0.614 * * * N oF oreignComps + 0.102N oSetof f s + 0.319 * * N oCCA + 0.062P ayT axF irst − 0.326 * * * BenchmarkData + 0.008Self InitiatedAdj + 0.321 * * N oCommissionaire + 0.075RelatedP arty + 0.39 * * * ContemporaryDoc + 0.035T P Doc+0.296P riority+0.533 * * * P enaltyU ncertainty+2.46 * * * T P Enf orceSvy+0.011 * * * Ageof Rules, where ***,**,* denote significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
8 The tprisk measure is available for countries whose country-specific detailed TPR characteristics are documented in Deloitte's Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide. Among the 27 countries in our sample (Table A.1), only Bosnia & Herzegovina is not included in the Global Transfer Pricing Country Guide.
9 For a discussion of the relationship between tax certainty and investment, see IMF and OECD (2017) .
is exogenously determined on the world capital market. Next to capital, the parent also supplies the subsidiary with intermediate inputs (x) used in production -which can also be thought of as firm-specific knowledge. The subsidiary generates output through production technology f (k, x), which features decreasing returns in each of the two inputs, capital and intermediates (i.e. f k , f x > 0, f kk , f xx < 0). Marginal factor productivity of each factor rises in the other input (f kx > 0).
The parent can buy the intermediate input at the local market at price p (or, alternatively, produce it and then sell at a fixed price p). However, when it supplies x to its subsidiary, the parent can charge a transfer price (p T ) that deviates from the arm's-length market price. The firm can shift profit between the parent and the subsidiary. Indeed, if the tax rate charged by the country where the subsidiary is located (τ s ) is lower than the tax rate charged by the country of the parent (τ h ) and the repatriation of income is exempt in the parent country, it will be attractive to shift income from the parent to subsidiary. In deviating the transfer price from the market price, however, the parent faces an expected cost (c), e.g. due to a penalty when caught or because of costs associated with a transfer pricing dispute. The expected cost per unit of intermediate input traded is assumed to rise quadratically in the price deviation, i.e. c = β(p T − p) 2 . The parameter β can be influenced by the government through TPR. For instance, TPR determines the probability of an adjustment in the transfer price or the penalty in case of detected mispricing. Hence, stricter TPR rules are reflected in a higher β.
Based on these assumptions, the subsidiary earns the following income:
which is taxed in the host country of the subsidiary. The income is assumed to be exempt in the parent country when distributed. The earnings of the parent company are as follows:
i.e. it earns direct income from the sale of the intermediate input, which is taxable at rate τ h , receives the profit from the subsidiary, which is taxable at rate τ s , and incurs the cost of financing k and the expected cost of deviating the transfer price from its arm's-length price.
The parent maximizes its profits with respect to three choice variables: k, x and p T . The first-order conditions of this maximization problem read as follows:
Eq. (3) shows the usual optimality condition for investment, indicating that a higher tax rate in the host country of the subsidiary will increase the cost of capital and, therefore, require a higher marginal product for investment to be undertaken. Under decreasing returns, this will reduce investment. Eq. (4) (5) determines the optimal transfer price. If the tax rate in the subsidiary country is lower than the tax rate in the parent country, Eq. (5) shows that the optimal transfer price used by the parent will be lower than the arm's-length price. This is because the lower transfer price will increase the income earned by the subsidiary and decrease direct income earned by the parent. This reduces the overall tax liability of the multinational. The extent to which the transfer price is reduced depends on the parameter β, i.e. the cost parameter that can be influenced by TPR.
Combining Eq. (4) and (5), we obtain an expression of the optimal supply of intermediate inputs:
Hence, Eq. (6) suggests that any tax differential between the parent and subsidiary will lead to a lower required marginal return to
Only if the tax difference is zero will f x be independent of tax parameters. Due to decreasing returns, this implies a higher supply of intermediate inputs,
f kx > 0, it will also imply a lower marginal product of capital and, therefore, an increase in
As long as the tax rate differ (τ h = τ s ), Eq. (6) also shows that TPR will influence the supply of intermediate inputs. This is reflected by the impact of a change in β, i.e.
(1−τ s )4β 2 < 0 so that ∂x/∂β > 0, i.e. stricter TPR will reduce the supply of intermediate inputs to the subsidiary. Since f kx > 0, this implies that stricter TPR also reduces the marginal product of capital f k and, therefore, investment ∂k/∂β < 0. Intuitively, stricter TPR will require a higher marginal return to capital to break even, and therefore, increases the cost of capital. This effect will only occur if the subsidiary is located in a different country than the parent and the tax rates in these countries differs. Indeed, the size of the effect rises in the tax differential between the two countries. If the parent and the subsidiary reside in the same country (or if tax rates between countries are the same),
Eq. (6) shows that an increase in β will have no implications for the optimal supply of x and, therefore, for optimal investment k. We use this difference in our empirical strategy to identify the effect of TPR on multinational investments, using wholly domestic firms as a control group. This constitutes our main hypothesis: Proposition 1 Stricter TPR will reduce investment by multinational parents in their foreign subsidiaries, but not by purely single-national parents in their domestic subsidiaries.
Data
The primary dataset for the empirical analysis is an unbalanced panel of 101,079 unique companies in 27 countries for the years 2006 to 2014. It is constructed using unconsolidated financial statements of affiliates that are part of a multinational or purely national company group in the ORBIS database provided by Bureau van Dijk.
10 A company is defined as a MNC affiliate if its ultimate parent company is in a different country and owns at least 50% of its shares. A company is defined as a domestic affiliate if (1) its ultimate parent company (owning at least 50% of its shares) is in the same country and (2) all other affiliates of the company group are in the same country of the parent company. The comparison is thus between MNC affiliates and affiliates of purely domestic company groups, excluding all independent, stand-alone companies that may be less comparable to MNCs. Figure 2 shows the distribution of multinational and domestic affiliates across industry sectors in the main dataset.
The main sample for regression analysis includes all non-financial, non-utility affiliates with non-missing (and non-zero) sales, total assets and fixed asset values. We discard any companies with missing industry information, with less than three consecutive observations, and in countries with less than 1,000 observations. We further eliminate MNC affiliates that locate in the same country as their parent company to create a sample of foreign affiliates of MNCs. Table A .1 shows the country distribution of affiliates in the main regression sample, distinguished by MNC affiliates and domestic affiliates.
Firm-level Data
The main variables for the analysis are investment in fixed capital assets, sales, cash flow, earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), and earnings before tax (EBT).
We compute investment spending (I t ) as the change in fixed tangible assets plus depreciation, i.e. I t = K t − K t−1 + depreciation, where capital stock (K t ) is the reported book value of fixed tangible asset in year t. Investment rate (I t /K t−1 ), is defined as the ratio between current-year gross investment spending and beginning-of-year capital stock. In some regressions we conduct separate analyses for intensive and extensive margin responses.
The intensive margin variable is the logarithm of investment spending. The extensive margin variable is an indicator for positive investment. Sales equal operating revenue. Sales growth rate equals the ratio between current-year and previous-year operating revenue minus 1. Cash flow rate is current-year cash flow divided by lagged capital stock. Profit margin is calculated as EBIT divided by sales. All ratio variables are winsorized at top and database that can be exploited to analyze the spillover effect of tax policy in a cross-country setting. It has been used extensively in both academic and policy research to assess the scale of profit shifting by multinational firms.
bottom 1 percentile to minimize influence of outliers.
Country-level Variables
As discussed in Section 2, our main variables of interest are the discrete binary indicator on the existence of some transfer pricing regulation (T P R), and the measure of the overall transfer-pricing strictness (tprisk ). These two policy variables are constructed based on information provided in Mescall and Klassen (2018) The tax differential, which proxies for the net tax savings from transfer mispricing, is the absolute difference between the host country and parent country statutory CIT rate. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the key variables that are used in the regression analysis.
Alternative regression samples In addition to the main regression sample that includes both multinational and domestic affiliates, we use alternative data in some of the analysis.
First, the analysis on the tax sensitivity of FDI in Section 6.3 uses a smaller MNC-only dataset that excludes domestic affiliates from the sample to focus on the tax sensitivity of multinational investment. Second, the analysis on the potential spillover effect of TPRs in Section 7 uses a sample of consolidated accounts in ORBIS. It includes companies that are parent of multinational or domestic company group to eliminate double counting, as regional headquarters are also required to file consolidated accounts. The sample for this analysis includes 17,638 observations corresponding to about 2,024 distinct non-financial, non-utility parent companies in more than 60 countries in the period from 2006 to 2014. Investment in the consolidated accounts reflect total investment of the company group. Finally, Section 6 uses a matched sample of multinational and domestic affiliates based on their average turnover, turnover growth rate, number of workers, and total assets during the sample period.
Empirical Specifications
This section describes the two main empirical strategies we use to identify the effect of TPRs on multinational investment: a difference-in-difference (DD) approach and a more traditional panel regression. The DD approach estimates the differential changes in investment by MNCs compared to that by domestic affiliates. The panel regression estimates the difference in the tax sensitivity of multinational investment before and after the introduction of TPR.
Difference-in-Difference
Our main empirical strategy is the standard DD approach. Intuitively, if the adoption of TPR raises the effective cost of capital only for multinationals, we would expect a subsequent reduction in their investment relative to the investment by otherwise similar affiliates that are part of purely domestic company groups. Formally, we test the investment response using the following specification:
where i indexes firms, k indexes the host country, and t indexes time. We control explicitly in this specification for changes in investment due to other non-tax factors by using a control group of affiliates from purely domestic companies. The latter are exposed to the same aggregate shocks as those experienced by the multinationals. The dependent variable Investment ikt denotes current-year investment spending I t divided by lagged capital stock
The key variable of interest is the interaction term between two dummy variables:
an indicator that takes the value of 1 if firm i is part of a multinational group and zero otherwise (M N C i ); and an indicator that takes the value of 1 for all the years following the introduction of TPR in country k, and zero otherwise (T P R kt ). 12 The coefficient β T P R represents the DD estimate of the effect of TPR on investment by MNC affiliates, and is expected to be negative following our theoretical prediction of Section 3.
13
Throughout the various specifications based on Eq. (7), a full set of firm fixed effects (a i ) is always included to control for unobserved heterogeneity in firm-level productivity and parent-company characteristics. Firm fixed effects subsume host-country fixed effects (given that affiliates do not change their location), controlling for time-invariant differences across host countries that may affect the location choice of multinationals. These considerations could include, for example, perceived average quality of governance during the sample period, common language and/or former colonial ties with the home country, and geographical distance between the home and host country. We also include a full set of time dummies (d t )
to capture the effect of aggregate macroeconomic shocks, including the effect of the great recession, that are common to both multinational and domestic companies. X ikt denotes a vector of firm-level non-tax determinants of investment, including proxies for firm size, its growth prospect, the degree of financial constraints and profitability. This is to control for the fact that foreign-owned firms may perform better than private domestic firms, which may imply different investment patterns (Manova et al., 2015) . Finally, ε ikt is the error term.
We include in most DD specifications the statutory corporate tax rate in the host country (or alternatively, a set of country-year fixed effects), to control for potential confounding effects of concurrent tax reforms on business investment. We also include a set of time-varying country characteristics (Z kt ) in the host countries, including GDP per capita, population, and unemployment rate to capture the effect of time-varying local productivity, market size and demand characteristics on investment. Our preferred specification includes a full set of industry-year fixed effects, country-year fixed effects, and country-industry fixed effects.
Taking the full set of fixed effects is crucial to identify the causal effect of TPR on investment.
Specifically, the two-way industry-year fixed effects control for the average investment in a given industry-year across all countries, taking out all the industry-specific shocks to business investments in each year. This fixed effect is important to control for any difference in the industry composition of MNCs compared to domestic companies. The second fixed effect, for country-year pairs, controls for macroeconomic shocks to investment that are common to all firms in each country-year pair. Finally, country-industry fixed effects control for all shocks to the supply or demand of fixed capital that are industry and country specific throughout the sample period. The coefficient of interest β T P R hence insulates the effect of TPR on MNC investment from many industry and country specific factors that could potentially confound the investment effects of the policy change.
Identification. Our DD strategy rests critically on the assumption that, prior to the introduction of TPRs, there are no differential changes in investment by MNCs relative to domestic companies, conditional on changes in non-TPR factors that are already empirically controlled for. We perform placebo tests to check the validity of the identification assumption by examining whether there was a differential change in MNC investment in any of the prelegislation years. Specifically, we estimate the model:
where P re − T P R l is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the l th year before the introduction of the TPR, and zero otherwise, and P ost − T P R n is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the n th year after the introduction of the TPR, and zero otherwise.
Without loss of generality for our test, we normalize β 0 = 0. In this specification, the assumption of parallel trends between the treated and control group corresponds to the hypothesis that all pre-TPR β l s are equal to each other, i.e. there is no significant change in the difference between investment by multinational and domestic affiliates in any of the pre-TPR years, even if the investment levels between the two groups could be different. Test for general equilibrium effects. As noted previously, the DD approach assumes away any general equilibrium effects that may affect the investment decision of domestic affiliates. For instance, if a reduction of multinational investment leads to an immediate expansion of domestic investment, then β T P R would underestimate the effect of the TPR on multinational investment. While it is difficult to determine the overall sign and size of these possible general equilibrium effects, we perform tests in a first-difference regression to show that the introduction of TPR has little effect on investment by domestic affiliates.
The results are summarized in Table A .2, where Column (1) includes controls for firm-level characteristics and a set of firm/year fixed effects. The coefficient on the T P R kt variable is small and insignificant. The T P R kt coefficient Column (2) adds country-level characteristics, whereas Columns (3) and (4) add industry-country fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects, respectively. The inclusion of additional controls leads to an even smaller coefficient estimate of T P R kt , which is around 0.006 and remains insignificant in all specifications. The weak correlation between TPR and investment by domestic firms in the control group is therefore suggestive of limited general equilibrium effect of TPRs in the DD setting.
Panel Regression
Our second regression follows a more structural approach to identify the impact of the introduction of TPR on MNC investment. One interpretation of the theoretical results of Section 3 is that a tightening of TPR increases the cost of capital on MNC investment. In principle, the model should allow us to quantify the effect of TPR on the cost of capital, by comparing the magnitude of cost of capital with and without TPR. Unfortunately, this
14 The coefficients on the M N C i × T P R kt × P ost − T P R n variables also shed lights on the dynamics of the investment effect. The results indicate that TPR has a large negative effect on investment in the first year after its adoption. This is consistent with that investment decisions are forward-looking. The size of its effect is smaller but remains significant in later years, indicating that TPRs have lasting permanent effect on MNC investment.
exercise is infeasible since we cannot measure the exact magnitude of the change in β in Eq.
(2) which would reflect the impact of TPR. We can, however, infer this impact indirectly by estimating the tax-sensitivity of MNC investment with and without TPR. This can be done either by using a direct measure for the cost of capital, or by using the statutory CIT rate as a proxy for the tax impact on investment.
To illustrate this idea, suppose that β tax is the semi-elasticity of MNC investment with respect to the corporate tax rate in the absence of TPR (i.e. β tax ≡
∂lnInvestment ∂CIT
). After the introduction of TPR, the semi-elasticity changes into γ tax = β tax + β T P R tax , where β T P R tax measures the change in the semi-elasticity as a result of the introduction of TPR. Using our sample, we can directly estimate β tax and β T P R tax from the following regression:
Since lnInvestment = β tax × (1 + ) × CIT t . We can call the latter the "TPR-adjusted" corporate tax rate. A similar exercise can be performed, using the cost of capital instead of the statutory CIT rate, which we can call the "TPR-adjusted" cost of capital. The empirical analysis below will measure these adjustments to infer the corresponding tax adjustment due to the introduction of TPR.
By exploring the time-series variation in the statutory CIT rate and in the cost of capital due to the introduction of TPR, this approach complements the DD analysis and has several advantages. First, a measure of the cost of capital captures differences across countries in their effective tax rates, e.g. due to different depreciation rules. Second, by focusing on MNCs the panel regression helps to address concern that the DD results may be driven by important life-cycle patterns of investment between domestic and foreign affiliates. For example, if foreign affiliates are on average younger than domestic firms, they may invest more than their mature counter parts. Moreover, it helps to further address the complication in the interpretation of the DD specification in the presence of general equilibrium effects, which is however rather limited in this setting as suggested by empirical evidence presented in Section 5.1.
Results
This section first provides direct evidence on the reduction in MNC investment in response to the introduction of TPR, based on the DD regression approach. It then presents robustness checks and discusses heterogeneity in responses. Finally, we estimate the "TPR-adjusted" semi-elasticity of multinational investment, using the structural approach. Table 3 presents the main DD regression results based on Eq. (7). Each regression in Table   3 includes a full set of firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. We report standard errors clustered at the firm level. Column (1) leaves out any country-level control variables. The DD coefficient is -0.049 and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that, on average, the introduction of TPR dampens MNC investment. The coefficient estimates on firm-level non-tax determinants of investment have the expected signs and are highly significant. For example, the negative coefficients on cash flow and profitability suggest that firms that are less financially constrained invest more in fixed capital assets. The positive coefficient on sales growth implies a positive link between firm-level investment and its growth prospect.
Baseline
Column (2) of Table 3 checks the robustness of the baseline finding by including the host country-level statutory CIT rate, population, unemployment rate, exchange rate, real GDP per capita, and GDP growth rate. This is to ensure that the DD estimate is not confounded with contemporaneous macroeconomic changes in the host country that may affect MNC investment. Inclusion of these country-level characteristics slightly reduces the magnitude of the DD coefficient from -0.049 to -0.041.
The next four columns of Table 3 check the robustness of the baseline finding by subsequently adding two-way country-year fixed effects in Column (3), two-way industry-year fixed effects in Column (4), two-way country-industry fixed effects in Column (5), and two-way home country-industry fixed effects in Column (6). In our preferred specification in Column (6), the DD estimate is -0.041 and significant at the 1 percent level. It suggests that, on average, the implementation of TPR reduces the investment rate (i.e. investment as a percentage of the fixed assets) by multinationals by 4.1 percentage point. Given that the average gross investment per dollar of fixed asset is 35.9 cents for multinational affiliates in the sample, this corresponds to 11.4 percent reduction in their investment. Finally, Column (7) of Table 3 Robustness. Table 4 presents regressions from alternative specifications and samples to test the robustness of the findings in Table 3 . Column (1) excludes profitability and sales growth rate from the firm-level controls to make sure that these variables do not drive the key result. Column (2) excludes affiliates with a parent residing in country that has a worldwide tax system, which could mute the incentive for profit shifting compared to territorial taxation. Column (3) clusters the standard errors at the host country level to address the concern that in tax reform studies, the standard errors can be understated by assuming independence across firms within the same tax jurisdiction (Bertrand et al., 2004) .
In all three columns, the result on the TPR variable remains unchanged.
Column (4) includes an interaction term between the MNC dummy indicator and a postcrisis indicator that takes the value of one for all years after the Great Recession period. This is to control for potential heterogeneity that multinational and domestic firms have performed differently during the Great Recession (Alviarez et al., 2017) . While the coefficient estimate of this interaction term is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, controlling for the potential differential impact of Great Recession on MNC investment does not substantially change our main coefficient of interest, which is around -0.037 in this specification.
Column (5) implements a matching DD strategy (Heckman et al. (1997) ) to address the concern that companies in the treated and control groups may not have similar observable characteristics, and that these differences may explain different trends in investment over time. The regression in Column (5) replicates the DD analysis on a subsample of matched firms from a Mahalanobis distance matching procedure based on average firm-level turnover, turnover growth, employment and total assets. The resulting estimate remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level for the matched sample, and the size of the coefficient remains similar. Table 5 explores heterogeneity in investment responses. Columns (1)-(4) focuses on heterogeneous investment effects of TPRs across firm characteristics, whereas Columns (5)- (8) present evidence on asymmetric effects of TPRs across countries.
Heterogeneous Responses
Extensive vs. Intensive Margin. The first two columns of Table 5 The size of tax differential. Eq. (6) suggests that the tax differential matters for the impact of TPRs on investment, with the impact becoming larger if the tax differential increases. 16 To explore this, we divide the sample into quartiles based on the tax differential, and then interact the main policy term in Eq. (7) with the quartile indicators:
Column (3) of Table 5 presents the coefficients obtained from this regression. The results suggest that the tax differential indeed matters. At the bottom quartile of tax differential, the response to TPR is negative but insignificant. This may be due to fixed costs associated with changing investment, or because MNCs shift very little profit if tax differentials are small due to the fixed cost of shifting. The investment effect is larger and highly significant in the 2 nd quartile of the tax differential, consistent with the theory. However, the impact does not increase monotonically in the tax differential. In fact, the coefficient becomes smaller and less significant in the 3 rd and 4 th quartile, although it remains negative and significant at 10 percent.
The intensity of intangible assets. For firms investing heavily in intangible assets, it can be difficult to find comparable prices to comply with the arm's length principle. For them, the impact of TPR on investment can be quite different. On the one hand, it might be that TPR offers little guidance as to how transfer prices should be determined. In that case, we might expect that the impact of TPR declines in the share of intangibles. On the other hand, it might also be that TPR is more important for them as it provides tax authorities with greater power to adjust transfer prices. The regression can show which of these is more likely. We test the effect of intangible asset intensity on the relationship between TPR and investment in the following specification:
where IntangShare i is the average level of intangible fixed assets relative to total assets for firm i during the sample period. In this specification, β T P R captures the impact of transfer pricing regulation on investment for firms with no intangible assets, whereas β Intang captures the changing impact of transfer pricing regulation on investment across firms of different intangible asset intensity. Table 5 Column (4) Interaction between TPRs and TCRs. MNCs can shift profits through different channels. For instance, apart from the manipulation of transfer prices, they can use intra-company loans to enjoy interest deductions in high-tax affiliates and have the interest taxed in lowtax affiliates. 17 Hence, it might be that MNCs will respond to the introduction of TPR by substituting away from abusive transfer pricing toward debt shifting through the use of intra-company loans (Saunders-Scott, 2015) . 18 Hence, TPRs might be less effective in restricting the overall profit shifting by MNCs if there are no TCRs in place due to unlimited substitution. In that case, the introduction of TPR might have little impact on the effective cost of capital for multinationals and we may expect a smaller effect on investment, relative to the case where a TCR is in place.
17 Beer et al. (2018) reviews existing empirical evidence on six main channels of international tax avoidance, including on transfer mispricing, strategic location of intellectual property (IP), international debt shifting, treaty shopping, corporate inversion/headquarter location, and tax deferral.
18 Saunders-Scott (2015) examines changes in the reported EBIT following a tightening of thincapitalization rules for multinational affiliates, using the ORBIS database. The findings suggest that MNCs use transfer mispricing and intra-company debt shifting as substitutes.
To examine the interaction between TPRs and TCRs, we divide the host countries in our sample into one group without any TCR, and a group with some TCR during the sample period.
19 . We then estimate separately the effect of TPR on multinational investment in each country group, using the DD regression based on Eq. 7. Columns (5) and (6) of Table   5 report these results. Interestingly and consistent with our prediction, the DD coefficient for countries without TCR is -0.013 and insignificant (Column (5)), while the DD coefficient for countries with TCR is almost three times larger and significant at 1 percent (Column (6)). Hence transfer mispricing and debt shifting are likely to be substitutes in MNC profit
shifting. The effectiveness of one measure against tax avoidance thus depends critically on other measures. At the same time, the more effective these packages become in limiting profit shifting, the more likely it becomes that they reduce MNC investment.
Low versus high-tax countries. Our main prediction in Section 3 suggests that the introduction of TPR should have an unambiguously negative impact on MNC investment in the respective country. On the other hand, the impact of the TPR on reported profits and tax revenues collected from MNCs is likely to differ. For high-tax countries, TPR will likely expand the tax base due to less outward profit shifting; but for low-tax countries, the opposite may occur, i.e. less inbound profit shifting. This suggests that the overall effect of TPR can vary across countries. For host countries with a lower tax rate than the representative country of a parent firm, i.e. beneficiaries from inward profit shifting, TPRs would lower tax revenue as well as investment. For host countries with a higher tax rate, TPR would restrict the extent of outward profit shifting and increase tax revenue, while the investment responses would offset the positive revenue effect.
To test for potential asymmetric effects of TPRs, we include in the regression an interaction term between the main variable of interest (M N C i × T P R ikt ) with a dummy indicator Low − T ax ikt . For each MNC affiliate, the Low − T ax ikt takes the value of 1 if the host country CIT rate is lower than the average CIT rate of its company group, defined as the unweighted average of the statutory CIT rates of all the countries where its company group operates. 20 Column (7) of Table 5 reports the results on investment. The coefficient estimate on the new interaction term is negative and insignificant, suggesting similar investment responses in high and low-tax countries. Column (8) of Table 5 reports the results on reported profits, replacing the dependent variable with the log of pre-tax profits defined as earnings net of interest expense but before taxes. Interestingly, introduction of TPR has a negative but insignificant effect on reported profits by MNCs in the high-tax countries, which may reflect the two offsetting effects of TPR on the tax base.. However, the effect on reported profits by MNCs in the low-tax countries is also negative, but three times larger and highly significant. The results therefore suggest that the overall effect of TPR on the corporate tax base and total revenue is asymmetric: it is negative for low-tax countries but ambiguous for high-tax countries. To directly measure the semi-elasticity of multinational investment, Column (3) uses the logarithm of fixed tangible assets as the dependent variable. In this specification, the coefficient on CIT can be directly interpreted as the semi-elasticity of MNC investment. The regression controls for output (proxied by log Sales) and employment (proxied by log Number of workers). The results suggest that the estimated semi-elasticity of fixed capital assets is slightly larger than one in the absence of TPR and highly significant. Hence, a 1 percentagepoint increase in the CIT rate will reduce MNC investment by approximately 1 percent.
TPR-adjusted tax elasticity
The tax effect increases by 0.24 in the presence of TPR to an overall semi-elasticity of 1.26.
Hence, after TPR introduction, corporate tax rates matter about one quarter more for MNC and would depend on the group structure of the MNC affiliate.
investment than before TPR. The reason is that, as MNCs find it more costly to avoid high tax rates through profit shifting, they become more responsive in their investment to those taxes. Following our interpretation in Section 5.2, the introduction of TPR corresponds to a "TPR-adjusted" CIT rate that is 23 percent larger than without TPR. Column (4) replaces the CIT rate with a measure of the cost of capital. The results are qualitatively the same and imply that the "TPR-adjusted" cost of capital is 15 percent larger than the cost of capital without TPR.
Relation to literature on tax policy and investment. The mean cost of capital for MNC affiliates in our sample is 0.07, which implies an estimated cost of capital elasticity of around -0.69. The magnitude is comparable to the average tax term elasticity of -0.69 in several studies of tax policy and investment that are summarized in Zwick and Mahon (2017) , 21 and falls within Hassett and Hubbard (2002) consensus range of -0.5 to -1. 22 Introduction of TPRs on average increases the cost of capital elasticity estimate by 15 percent from -0.6 to an overall elasticity estimate of -0.69 thereafter.
Effect on Total MNC Investment
The reduction in fixed capital investment by MNC affiliates identified in Section 6 may have two alternative interpretations: it could reflect a reduction in total investment due to a higher cost of capital for the entire MNC company group; or a relocation of investment to other affiliates of the same MNC group. Both investment responses reduce output in the host country in similar ways. However, they have very different economic implications for the rest of the world. Indeed, lower investment by the MNC group would unambiguously reduce global output, while a reallocation of investments across countries would imply a shift of production toward countries that enjoy an inflow of investment. Global output might still decline due to production inefficiency, but is smaller under the second scenario. Of course, 21 These include Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994, 1996) , Desai and Goolsbee (2004) , and Edgerton (2010).
22 It is significantly smaller, however, than the tax term elasticity of -1.6 in Zwick and Mahon (2017) . The latter uses corporate tax records of both MNC and domestic firms to analyze the effect of bonus depreciation on investment by US firms, and find that small domestic firms are more responsive to corporate taxes.
cross-country spillovers of this kind can intensify tax competition among national governments and ultimately lead to too lenient TPR in all countries, if there is no international cooperation.
23
To identify the impact of TPR on total investment of the MNC group, we use a similar DD strategy based on Eq. (7). All the key variables are as previously defined but are now based on consolidated accounts of the parent company. In particular, Investment ikt now reflects the amount of worldwide investment by the MNC group with parent company i in country k. T P R kt is a discrete dummy variable that takes the value of one if there is some transfer pricing regulation in the parent country k, and zero otherwise. It is important to note that the T P R kt variable defined in this way only captures the effect of TPR in the parent country, ignoring the effect of TPRs in any other countries where affiliates of the same MNC group operate. This implies that there can be measurement error in the T P R kt variable to determine the impact of TPRs on the multinational group's investment, leading to attenuation bias. Table 7 summarizes the results, where the DD coefficient captures the impact of parentcountry TPR on total investment by the MNC group. Column (1) reports the baseline regression results based on Eq. (7) with no country-level controls. Contrary to our expectation, the DD coefficient is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, and remains significant with inclusion of country-level characteristics in Column (2). However, the DD coefficient becomes insignificant when including country-year fixed effects in Column (3), suggesting that the significance of the DD coefficient may reflect other country-specific common trends in MNC investment that are unrelated to the introduction of TPR. The DD coefficient remains insignificant when adding industry-year fixed effects and industry-country fixed effects in Column (4). Column (5) interacts the discrete interaction term with the top statutory CIT rate in the parent country, and the basic finding remains unchanged.
24 Overall, the absence of a clear effect of TPR on MNC consolidated investment suggests that the negative effect of TPRs on investment in foreign affiliates might indeed be due to a relocation effect 23 Peralta et al. (2006) shows in a fiscal competition model that this is indeed the case: a country may optimally decide not to control international profit shifting in order to attract more MNCs.
24 The basic finding also remains unchanged when interacting the discrete interaction term with the tprisk variable.
of investment.
Conclusions
Despite increased global interest in transfer pricing regulations to mitigate tax avoidance by multinational companies-most notably due to the G20/OECD project on base erosion and profit shifting-there is no empirical evidence on their implications for investment. This paper fills this gap. It uses a quasi-experimental research design, exploiting a large micro data set of unconsolidated accounts of both multinational affiliates and affiliates of purely Our results have important policy implications. For example, unilateral introduction of transfer pricing regulation will distort the international allocation of capital; and the negative investment effect can make countries reluctant to adopt them or make them more lenient. Binding international coordination can prevent this, but might not be beneficial for all countries. Also, broad coverage of different anti-avoidance measures is important, as avoidance channels may be substitutes: restricting only one channel will therefore cause a substitution toward other channels of profit shifting.
More research is needed to understand these real effects of other anti-avoidance regulations, including rules that restrict interest deductibility, provisions against treaty abuse, and more general anti-avoidance rules. The interaction between these anti-tax avoidance rules and other tax policy parameters, such as corporate tax rates, is important. These issues are left for further research. th and 75 th percentiles, and the minimum and maximum value of tprisk in a box plot. The dots denote the minimum value of tprisk in later years which are outside the inter-quartile range of the tprisk which is bounded by the vertical line. 
l=−5 β l M N C i × T P R kt × P reT P R l + P ostT P Rn β n M N C i × T P R kt × P ostT P R n + β x x ikt + β z z kt + ε ikt , where P reT P R l is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the l th year before the introduction of the TPR, and zero otherwise, and P ostT P R n is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the n th year post the introduction of the TPR, and zero otherwise. We normalize β 0 = 0 in the year of TPR introduction. In this estimation, the null hypothesis that there is no difference in pre-reform trends is equivalent to the null hypothesis that all pre-reform β l coefficients are equal to each other. The last row reports the p−value for this joint test. Notes: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the transfer pricing regulation on investment by multinational affiliates. All columns display the DD coefficient on the M N C i × T P R kt variable, from a regression of investment on this interaction, affiliate fixed effects, year fixed effects and additional controls. Investment is gross investment scaled by book value of fixed capital asset in (end of) previous year. Affiliate-Level controls include lagged turnover, lagged turnover growth rate, cash flow scaled by lagged asset, and lagged profit margin. All firm-level ratio variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1 percentile to remove the influence of outliers. Additional country-level controls in Column (2) include statutory corporate tax rate, GDP per capita, population size, unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, and exchange rate in the host country. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: this table reports difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the transfer pricing regulation on investment by multinational affiliates. All columns display the DD coefficient on the M N C i × T P R kt variable, from a regression of investment on this interaction, affiliate fixed effects, year fixed effects and additional controls. The dependent variable is gross investment scaled by book value of fixed capital asset in (end of) previous year. Affiliate-Level controls include lagged turnover, lagged turnover growth rate, cash flow scaled by lagged asset, and lagged profit margin. All other variables are as previously defined. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(8) Notes: This table presents regression results on the heterogeneous effect of TPR on investment. The dependent variable in Column (1) is a dummy indicator that takes the value of 1 for positive investment, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in Column (2) is the level of investment in logarithm. Column (3) reports the effect of TPR across the tax differential quartiles.
The dummy variable Quartile T axDif f,j takes the value of 1 if the absolute difference between the home and parent country tax rate lies in the j th quartile, and zero otherwise. Column (4) reports the effect of TPR across varying shares of intangible assets.
The intangible asset share variable is calculated for each firm the average intangible fixed assets relative to its total assets over the sample period. Columns (5) and (6) report the effect of TPR in countries without and with thin-capitalization rules, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) test for differential effects of TPR on investment and reported profits in low-and high-tax countries, respectively. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Notes: This table reports the effect of taxes, including CIT rate and the cost of capital, on multinational investment with and without TPR. All columns display the estimated coefficient on the tax variable, from a regression of investment on the tax variable, firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and additional controls. Investment is gross investment scaled by book value of fixed capital asset in (end of) previous year in Columns (1)- (2), and logarithm of tangible fixed asset in Columns (3)-(4). Affiliate-Level controls include lagged turnover, lagged turnover growth rate, cash flow scaled by lagged asset, and lagged profit margin in Columns (1)- (2), and logarithms of turnover and number of employees in Columns (3)-(4). All firm-level ratio variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1 percentile to remove the influence of outliers. Host country-level controls include GDP per capita and GDP growth rate. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Notes: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the transfer pricing regulation on worldwide investment by MNC group. All columns display the DD coefficient on the M N C i × T P R kt variable, from a regression of investment on this interaction, MNC group fixed effects, year fixed effects and additional controls. Investment is gross investment scaled by book value of fixed capital asset in (end of) previous year. Affiliate-Level controls include lagged turnover, lagged turnover growth rate, cash flow scaled by lagged asset, and lagged profit margin. All firm-level ratio variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1 percentile to remove the influence of outliers. Additional country-level controls in Column (2) include statutory corporate tax rate, GDP per capita, population size, unemployment rate, GDP growth rate, and exchange rate in the parent country. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
A Institutional Background
This section describes the transfer pricing regulations that were introduced between 2006 and 2014 in our sample countries.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), Articles 45 and 48 of the FBiH Corporate Profit Tax law covers transfer pricing regulations, and for Republika Srpska (RS), Article 9 of the RS Corporate Profit Tax Law specifies the transfer pricing regulation. In general, there is little correlation between the timing of TPR introduction and the level of development for countries in our sample. For example, the unconditional correlation between the TPR discrete dummy indicator and a country's GDP and Per-Capita GDP is 0.04 and 0.03, respectively, and the correlation between the TPR variable and a country's statutory CIT rate is around 0.22 in our sample. 
M N C i × T P R Notes: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the transfer pricing regulation on investment by multinational affiliates across seven industry sectors. All columns display the DD coefficient on the M N C i × T P R kt variable, from a regression of investment on this interaction, affiliate fixed effects, year fixed effects and additional controls. Investment is gross investment scaled by book value of fixed capital asset in (end of) previous year. Affiliate-Level controls include lagged turnover, lagged turnover growth rate, cash flow scaled by lagged asset, and lagged profit margin. All firm-level ratio variables are winsorized at top and bottom 1 percentile to remove the influence of outliers. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at firm level. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
